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Abstract 
Categorisation models of metaphor interpretation are based on the premiss that 
categorisation statements (e.g., ‘Wilma is a nurse’) and comparison statements (e.g., 
‘Betty is like a nurse’) are fundamentally different types of assertion. Against this 
assumption, we argue that the difference is merely a quantitative one: ‘x is a y’ 
unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’, and therefore the latter is merely weaker than the 
former. Moreover, if ‘x is like a y’ licenses the inference that x is not a y, then that 
inference is a scalar implicature. We defend these claims partly on theoretical grounds 
and partly on the basis of experimental evidence. A suite of experiments indicates both 
that ‘x is a y’ unilaterally entails that x is like a y, and that in several respects the non-y 
inference behaves exactly as one should expect from a scalar implicature. We discuss 
the implications of our view of categorisation and comparison statements for 




Is an apple like a fruit?  




Categorisation models of metaphor interpretation are based on the premiss that 
categorisation statements (e.g., ‘Wilma is a nurse’) and comparison statements (e.g., 
‘Betty is like a nurse’) are fundamentally different types of assertion. Against this 
assumption, we argue that the difference is merely a quantitative one: ‘x is a y’ 
unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’, and therefore the latter is merely weaker than the 
former. Moreover, if ‘x is like a y’ licenses the inference that x is not a y, then that 
inference is a scalar implicature. We defend these claims partly on theoretical grounds 
and partly on the basis of experimental evidence. A suite of experiments indicates both 
that ‘x is a y’ unilaterally entails that x is like a y, and that in several respects the non-y 
inference behaves exactly as one should expect from a scalar implicature. We discuss 
the implications of our view of categorisation and comparison statements for 
categorisation models of metaphor interpretation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The distinction between comparison and categorisation statements has been of central 
importance to theoretical debates on the metaphor-simile distinction – a recurrent 
theme in the metaphor literature for the last forty years (e.g., Kintsch, 1974; Ortony, 
1979; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Kennedy & Chiappe, 1999; Carston, 2002; Glucksberg, 
Manuscript (without any authors' affiliations)
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2008; Carston & Wearing, 2011; Barnden, 2012).1 This distinction has also been central to 
the numerous empirical studies that have compared the use and interpretation of 
metaphors and similes (e.g., Johnson, 1996; Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999; Chiappe et al., 
2003a; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a; Utsumi, 2007; Pierce & Chiappe, 2008; Haught, 
2013a). Generally speaking, standard models in the Aristotelian tradition have 
emphasised the commonalities between metaphors and similes, while more recent 
accounts underline the differences between the two.  
To illustrate what is at issue, consider the following examples: 
(1) A papaya is a fruit. 
(2) ?A papaya is like a fruit. 
(3) A papaya is like a mango. 
(4) My lawyer is a shark. 
(5) My lawyer is like a shark. 
As the last two examples illustrate, metaphors and their corresponding similes can be 
used interchangeably. However, turning a literal categorisation statement into a 
comparison statement is not unproblematic, as the first two examples show. This is 
what Glucksberg (2011) calls ‘the paradox of unlike things compared’. On the 
traditional view, metaphors are implicit similes (see, e.g., Aristotle in Barnes, 1984; 
Kintsch, 1974; Grice, 1975; Miller, 1979; Ortony, 1979; Searle, 1979; Fogelin, 1988; 
Gentner et al., 2001; Israel et al., 2005). This is why one type of sentence can be used to 
paraphrase the other, as in (4) and (5). By contrast, categorisation models of metaphor 
interpretation claim that metaphors and similes are understood in fundamentally 
different ways: ‘the metaphor as a categorisation assertion, the simile as an assertion of 
                                                 
1 Following this literature, we understand similes as figurative comparisons (e.g., ‘My love is like a rose’), 
which are different from literal comparisons (e.g., ‘My love is like her mother’). Seen this way, similes are 




similitude’ (Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a:361; see also Chiappe & Kennedy, 2001; 
Glucksberg, 2001, 2011; Carston, 2002; Carston & Wearing, 2011; Haught, 2013a). 
Against the traditional view, categorisation models of metaphor interpretation have 
often stressed how the interpretation of metaphors and similes differ, despite their 
apparent interchangeability (see Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a, 2006b and Haught, 
2013a, 2013b, for empirical evidence). 
According to the categorisation view of metaphor, the reason why it is possible to 
paraphrase a simile as a nominal metaphor and vice versa is that in the simile the 
‘vehicle’ of the figurative expression (e.g., the word ‘shark’ in (4) and (5)) stands for the 
literal concept, whereas in the metaphor the vehicle stands for a superordinate category 
including not only members of the literal category (e.g., real sharks) but also other 
entities that share relevant properties with the prototype for the superordinate category 
(e.g., my lawyer). The fact that metaphor vehicles are polysemous between their literal 
and figurative meanings explains that the same word can be used to express both a 
comparison statement (as in example (5)) and a categorisation statement (as in (4)) , 
with the same word naming distinct categories at different levels of abstraction (i.e. the 
literal concept SHARK in the simile and the superordinate category SHARK* in the 
metaphor; 2 see, e.g., Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg, 2001, 2011; Carston, 2002; 
Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a; Sperber & Wilson, 2008; Haught, 2013a).3 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that not only metaphors but also brand names can become polysemous in this way. 
For example, the name ‘Kleenex’ can be used to refer to a specific type of paper tissue or to paper tissues 
in general (see Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990 and Sperber & Wilson, 2008, for a discussion of this and other 
examples). It is the contention of categorisation models that this kind of language use is ubiquitous in 
everyday language (including sign languages) and therefore does not require a special interpretation 
mechanism that distinguishes metaphorical language from literal language. 
3 See also Glucksberg & Keysar (1990, 1993) for an earlier categorisation model of metaphor 
interpretation, according to which similes are implicit metaphors (i.e. comparisons to a superordinate 
category; cf. Carston, 2002). 
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In summary, according to the comparison view, examples (4) and (5) are equivalent 
because metaphors are implicit similes. By contrast, according to categorisation models, 
the nominal metaphor in (4) is the figurative counterpart of the literal categorisation 
statement in (1), while the simile in (5) is the figurative counterpart of the literal 
comparison statement in (3). 
In the present study we investigated the comprehension of literal comparison and 
categorisation statements. Our starting point was the distinction drawn by 
categorisation models of metaphor interpretation between similes and metaphors as 
fundamentally distinct types of expression. In defending this view, Keysar makes the 
following argument: 
Category membership is incompatible with assertions of similarity, e.g., if 
‘Copper is a metal’ is acceptable, then ‘Copper is like a metal’ is not 
acceptable. Similarly, if one asserts and believes that someone is an actual 
baby, then one cannot simultaneously assume that the person is ‘like’ a 
baby. (Keysar, 1989: 380-381) 
The same argument has been made on the basis of similar examples in various other 
papers defending the categorisation view of metaphor (see, e.g., Glucksberg & Keysar, 
1990, 1993; Kennedy & Chiappe, 1999; Chiappe & Kennedy, 2001; Carston, 2002; 
Glucksberg, 2003; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006a; Barnden, 2012). In a similar vein, 
Glucksberg makes the following generalisation: 
The relative position of terms within such hierarchical categories 
determines when comparisons are permissible and when categorical 
assertions are permissible. In general, comparisons are restricted to terms 
that refer at the same level of abstraction. Thus, we can have comparisons 
between superordinates, as in fresh fruits are like salad greens, but not 
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between superordinates and subordinates within a category, as in lettuce is 
like salad greens or romaine lettuce is like lettuce. When two entities are at 
different levels in a taxonomic hierarchy, then the appropriate relation is 
categorical, not one of similitude, as in lettuce is a salad green or romain is a 
(kind of) lettuce. (Glucksberg, 2001: 42) 
While we agree with the view that interpreting novel nominal metaphors involves the 
construction of a superordinate category on the basis of the metaphor vehicle (Rubio-
Fernández, 2007), we contest the claim that a comparison statement (‘x is like a y’) 
contradicts the corresponding categorisation statement (‘x is a y’). We argue (A) that 
categorisation statements are stronger than, and therefore compatible with, comparison 
statements,4 and (B) that if an utterance of ‘x is a y’ licenses the inference that x not a y, 
this inference is pragmatic in nature; specifically, it is a scalar implicature. Therefore, 
should statements like ‘An apple is like a fruit’ turn out to be infelicitous (which 
remains to be seen), then the cause is pragmatic rather than semantic. 
The aim of the present study is to provide empirical evidence for these hypotheses. The 
paper is structured as follows. Having developed in some detail our Hypotheses A and 
B (Section 2), we present a series of Mechanical-Turk experiments we conducted to test 
our hypotheses.5 (For better readability, this discussion will skimp on methodological 
and statistical details, which are presented in full in the Appendix.) Section 3 gives 
evidence that ‘x is a y’ is semantically stronger than ‘x is like a y’; Section 4 shows that, 
at least some of the time, utterances of ‘x is like a y’ license the inference that x is not a y; 
                                                 
4 A related argument has been made by Kennedy and Chiappe (2001) who argued that literal 
categorisation statements (e.g., ‘That is an apple’) are used when the two concepts share many common 
properties, while comparison statements (e.g., ‘That is like an apple’) are used when they share few 
common properties. 
5 It has been shown that the quality of data gathered through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is comparable 
to that of laboratory data (Schnoebelen & Kuperman, 2010; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Sprouse, 2011; Crump 
et al., 2013). 
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and Section 5 presents data that comport with our hypothesis that this inference is a 
scalar implicature. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the implications of our account for 
categorisation models of metaphor interpretation. 
Before we get started, we should make it clear that the hypotheses we are about to 
defend do not amount to a fully fledged account of categorisation and comparison 
statements, let alone a theory of metaphor and simile comprehension. We do believe, 
however, that our hypotheses, if true, impose substantial constraints on theories that 
attempt to deal with the metaphor-simile distinction and have debated it for decades. 
Hence, we will discuss some of the implications of our results for categorisation models 
of metaphor interpretation at the end of the paper, though will do so only at a general 
level; a detailed theoretical analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2. Unilateral entailment and scalar implicature 
From a semantical point of view, to say that ‘x is a y’ is stronger than ‘x is like a y’ is to 
say that, by virtue of their respective meanings, the former sentence is true whenever 
latter is true, but not vice versa. The key notion here is ‘entailment’, which is standardly 
defined as follows (where S1 and S2 are arbitrary sentences): 
Entailment 
S1 entails S2 if and only if S2 is true whenever S1 is true. 
For example, (6) and (7) each entail (8) and they entail one another too: (6) is true 
whenever (7) is true and vice versa. 
(6) Fred is an oculist. 
(7) Fred is an ophthalmologist. 
(8) Fred is a physician. 
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If two sentences entail one another, they are equally strong. If one sentence entails 
another but not the other way round, the former makes a stronger a statement than the 
latter. This is unilateral entailment: 
Unilateral entailment 
S1 unilaterally entails S2 if and only if S1 entails S2 but not the other way 
round. 
For example, (6) and (7) each unilaterally entail (8) but not the other. Hence, (6) makes a 
stronger statement than (8), and so does (7). 
Thus, the first hypothesis we will defend in this paper is the following: 
(A) ‘x is a y’ unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’. 
It is a recurrent observation in the metaphor literature that nominal metaphors are 
‘stronger’, more ‘direct’ or more ‘forceful’ than the corresponding similes (e.g., Ortony, 
1979; Fogelin,1988; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1993; Stern, 2000; Carston, 2002; Zharikov & 
Gentner, 2002; Chiappe et al., 2003a; Israel et al., 2005; Glucksberg, 2011; cf. 
O’Donoghue, 2009). The most straightforward explanation for these intuitions is that ‘x 
is a y’ is stronger than ‘x is like a y’ simply by virtue of what these sentences mean; that 
is to say, the reason why ‘x is a y’ appears stronger than ‘x is like a y’ is that the former 
unilaterally entails the latter. 
Another intuition that is often voiced in the literature is that ‘x is a y’ is incompatible 
with ‘x is like a y’. A possible reason for this incompatibility is that ‘x is like a y’ implies 
that x is not a y. If this intuition is correct, it would seem to contradict our Hypothesis 
A. For if ‘x is a y’ implies ‘x is like a y’, as Hypothesis A has it, and ‘x is like a y’ implies 




This paradox is resolved by our second hypothesis: 
(B) If an utterance of ‘x is like a y’ licenses the inference that x is not a y, then this 
inference is a scalar implicature. 
To explain the notion of scalar implicature, consider the following examples (see 
Geurts, 2010 for a review): 
(9) Fred ate all the cookies. 
(10) Fred ate some of the cookies. 
(9) is clearly stronger than (10): if Fred ate all the cookies, he must have eaten some of 
the cookies, but the converse doesn’t hold. Nonetheless, it is a well-known observation 
that an utterance of (10) may license the inference that, according to the speaker, Fred 
did not eat all the cookies and therefore (9) is false. This inference can be accounted for 
as a pragmatic inference; that is to say, as an inference that follows, not from the 
sentence as such, but from the fact that a speaker utters this sentence in a given context 
and that the hearer is entitled to reason as follows: 
Scalar implicature 
If the speaker believed that (10) is true, he should have said so, but instead he 
chose to make a weaker claim, (9). Therefore, he probably doesn’t believe that (10) 
is true. 
Sentence (9) unilaterally entails sentence (10), and by uttering sentence (10) a speaker 
may license the implicature that he doesn’t accept that (9) is the case. But it clearly 
doesn’t follow that sentence (9) implies its own falsehood. Likewise, ‘x is a y’ 
unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’ (Hypothesis A), and by uttering ‘x is like a y’ a speaker 
may license the implicature that he doesn’t accept that x is a y (Hypothesis B). But it 
doesn’t follow that ‘x is a y’ implies its own falsehood.  
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It follows from our Hypothesis A that, contrary to what has been claimed by 
proponents of the categorisation theory of metaphor, corresponding categorisation and 
comparison statements are not incompatible with one another; for according to 
Hypothesis A, if ‘x is a y’ is true, then ‘x is like a y’ is true as well. Nonetheless, there 
appears to be a rather strong intuition that ‘x is like a y’ implies that x is not a y, and 
Hypothesis B explains where this intuition comes from: it is a pragmatic inference, 
namely a scalar implicature. Therefore, the tension between ‘x is a y’ and ‘x is like a y’ 
doesn’t run as deep as categorisation theories of metaphor have claimed: the two types 
of statement are compatible at the semantical level; the tension is merely pragmatic.6 
 
3. Evidence for Hypothesis A: ‘x is y’ unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’ 
That categorisation statements are stronger than comparison statements is indicated by 
the standard diagnostics (Horn, 1989; Matsumoto, 1995).7 
                                                 
6 According to our reviewers, sentences like (i) are problematic for our account: 
 
(i) Nixon was a Quaker, but he was not like a Quaker. 
 
(For the benefit of any readers under 40 that may have wandered into this article: Richard Milhous Nixon 
was the 37th president of the United States, and he was in fact a Quaker.) Assuming that (i) is felicitous at 
all (and we are not entirely convinced that it is; cf. 'Nixon was a Quaker, but he did not behave like a 
Quaker'), it may seem to defy our hypothesis that ‘Nixon was a Quaker’ entails ‘Nixon was like a 
Quaker’, because the entailment would render (i) contradictory. But rather than giving rise to a 
contradiction, (i) seems to imply that Nixon was not like an ordinary or ‘normal’ Quaker. This suggests 
that the two occurrences of ‘a Quaker’ denote slightly different concepts, which is not uncommon in 
contrastive environments (Geurts, 1998), as (ii) illustrates: 
 
(ii) That’s not a car, it’s a Ferrari. 
 
This kind of contrast appears to be required in order to support the intended meaning of (i), which we 
take to be that Nixon was by definition a Quaker, but was unlike an archetypal Quaker. 
7 Note that all these examples are marked in the linguistic sense of the word, and therefore would 
typically be used in somewhat special circumstances; for example, to correct another speaker. However, 
this doesn’t affect our argument in any way (see Chiappe & Kennedy, 2000 for a discussion of the use of 
metaphors to correct similes). 
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(11) A kumquat is like a citrus fruit, and in fact it IS a citrus fruit. 
(12) Not only is a kumquat LIKE a citrus fruit, it IS a citrus fruit. 
(13) I’m pretty sure that a kumquat is like a citrus fruit, and for all I know it might 
even BE a citrus fruit. 
The mere fact that these sentences are felicitous shows that ‘x is like a y’ and ‘x is a y’ are 
compatible. Furthermore, each of these constructions can only be used if the first 
statement is weaker than the second. Cf. 
(14) She is intelligent, and in fact she is brilliant. 
(15) ?He is intelligent, and in fact he is tall. 
These observations already indicate that ‘x is a y’ is merely stronger than ‘x is like a y’, 
and they are corroborated by web data: 
(16) It's like a registry key name (and, in fact, on PC it is a registry key). 
(17) She is like a sister to me; in fact, she is my sister from another mother. 
Further evidence is provided by the following observation. The inference pattern ‘If S1 
then S2; therefore if S3 then S2’ only is valid if S3 entails S1. Now consider the following 
pair of sentences: 
(18) If kumquats are like citrus fruits, we can use them for our Christmas punch. 
(19) If kumquats are citrus fruits, we can use them for our Christmas punch. 
Clearly, a speaker who accepts (18) is committed to the truth of (19), so again it follows 
that a categorisation statement entails the corresponding comparison statement. 
Experiment 1a investigated how people would interpret comparison and categorisation 
statements in a sentence verification task using made-up words accompanied by 
summary definitions consisting of three attributes; Figure 1 shows a sample item. The 
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point of the first experiment was to investigate people’s interpretations of comparison 
and categorization statements independently from their world knowledge. 
 
Figure 1: Item from Experiment 1a (the figure satisfies all the properties in the definition). 
 
The shapes on display had between zero and three of the attributes included in the 
definition, so there were four levels of similarity between the figure and the definition, 
which we will refer to as L0-L3. The target sentences were comparison and 
categorisation statements (e.g., ‘This one is like a ral’ vs. ‘This one is a ral’). In each case, 
participants had to indicate whether the sentence was true or false of the shape on 
display. As shown in Figure 2, categorisation statements were accepted only in the 
L3-condition, and in this condition the average rate of ‘true’ responses was close to 
100%; in the L0, L1, and L2 conditions, the corresponding rates were below 5%. The 
comparison statements, too, were close to ceiling level in the L3-condition, but their 
rates of ‘true’ responses didn’t fall as abruptly as with the categorisation statements; 
rather, they declined gradually, and only the L0-items were unanimously rejected. This 
pattern was replicated in Experiment 1b, which used the same design as Experiment 1a, 





Figure 2: Mean proportions of TRUE responses to categorisation and comparisons statements in 
Experiment 1a (SE bars; asterisk p < .001). 
Our results are clearly at odds with the claim that a comparison statement is 
incompatible with the corresponding categorisation statement. Secondly, the response 
pattern observed in Experiment 1a shows that, in the context of this experiment, at least, 
‘x is a y’ unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’; for the latter was accepted whenever the 
former was, and not vice versa. This is in line with Hypothesis A, and contradicts the 
claim that categorisation and comparison statements are semantically incompatible. 
Since the materials used in Experiments 1a and 1b were patently artificial, we replicated 
Experiment 1a using a familiar category, namely animals; Figure 3 shows a sample 
item. Participants saw pictures of a tiger, for example, accompanied by either a 
categorisation statement (‘This one is a tiger’) or a comparison statement (‘This one is 
like a tiger’). The predicate denoted either a superordinate (‘wild animal’ for tiger), the 
same category as the referent (‘tiger’), a merely similar category (‘lion’) or a dissimilar 




Figure 3: Item from Experiment 2. 
The results of Experiment 2 were virtually identical to those of the first experiments (see 
Figure 4). Most importantly, comparison statements of the form ‘This one is like a y’ 
were accepted over 90% of the time if the picture showed a y. 8 Hence, the conclusions 
we drew from the first experiments remain unchanged: we find no support for claims to 
the effect that ‘x is like a y’ and ‘x is a y’ are incompatible, and it appears that according 
to impartial informants ‘x is a y’ unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’, since the latter was 
accepted whenever the former was, but not vice versa. 
 
                                                 
8 Materials were presented in a quasi-random order so that participants had to verify ‘This one is a tiger’ 
before the corresponding comparison statement. Thus we ensured that participants had correctly 
identified the animal in question, and didn’t agree to ‘This one is like a tiger’ because they thought it was 
a similar animal, though not a tiger. 
14 
 
Figure 4: Mean proportions of TRUE responses to categorisation and comparison statements in 
Experiment 2 (SE bars; asterisk p < .001). 
 
4. Evidence that ‘x is like a y’ licenses the inference that x is not a y (at least 
some of the time) 
In Experiments 1a, 1b and 2 we observed hardly any instances in which participants 
took ‘x is like a y’ to imply that x is not a y. This finding is consistent with our 
Hypothesis B, which states that if a comparison statement licenses this inference, it is 
due to a scalar implicature and not an entailment. However, our results sit somewhat 
uneasily with intuitions reported by Glucksberg and Keysar, Carston, Chiappe and 
others to the effect that, for example, ‘A nuthatch is like a bird’ is an unacceptable 
statement. Therefore, we conducted another experiment, which aimed to determine 
whether the non-y inference would emerge in a different set-up. 
In Experiment 3 we adopted an inference paradigm, asking participants directly 
whether they would draw a non-y inference from a statement of the form ‘x is like a y’, 
using trials like the following: 
John says: ‘My mother is like a nurse.’ 
Would you conclude from this that, according to John, his mother is not a 
nurse?  
Generally speaking, inference tasks of this type yield higher proportions of positive 
results than the corresponding verification tasks (Evans et al., 1993; Geurts & 
Pouscoulous, 2009; Geurts, 2010). There are various possible reasons for this, which 
need not exclude each other, but the most obvious one is that people are generally more 
likely to accept an inference that is presented explicitly. We therefore expected higher 




 CONDITIONS SAMPLE ITEMS 
 Inference Knowledge Statement Conclusion 
(A) True Common A zebra is like a horse A zebra is not a horse 
(B) False Common A robin is like a bird A robin is not a bird 
(C) True (lit.) Common The coach’s voice is like a foghorn The coach’s voice isn’t a foghorn 
(D) Possible Private My watch is like a Rolex My watch is not a Rolex 
Table 1: Conditions and sample items from Experiment 3 (inference task). 
 
Table 1 summarises the four conditions used in Experiment 3. As can be seen in this 
table, three of the conditions relied on common knowledge: in condition (A), it was 
common knowledge that the target inference is true; in condition (B), that it is false; and 
in condition (C), that is true but only if the predicate is construed literally. Condition 
(D) relied on the speaker’s private knowledge. 
We expected condition (A) to reveal the highest proportion of positive responses, 
because it should benefit from a positive belief bias: participants were likely to know 
that the non-y inference was true, and thus be biased towards a positive response. 
Contrariwise, we expected condition (B) to yield the lowest agreement rates since 
participants were likely to know that the non-y inference was false, and thus be biased 
towards a negative response (i.e. negative belief bias). Thirdly, we expected the results 
of condition (D) to be between those in conditions (A) and (B) since the non-y inference 
relied on the speaker’s private knowledge and hence participants shouldn’t suffer from 
any kind of belief bias. Finally, we expected the results of condition (C) to be 
intermediate, too, since positive responses depended on a literal construal of the 
conclusion. That is, if taken literally, the C-inferences were obviously true since x and y 
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were unrelated concepts in that condition. However, given the figurative interpretation 
of the C-statements (which were effectively similes), participants may be prompted to 
interpret the conclusion as a negated metaphor and hence reject it on the basis that if a 
simile is true, then the corresponding metaphor must also be true. 
The results of Experiment 3 are shown in Figure 5. As predicted, A-inferences were 
endorsed significantly more often than all others; B-inferences showed the lowest 
agreement rates, but were nonetheless endorsed more than half the time (67%), despite 
the negative belief bias;9 and the rates for C- and D-inferences were in the mid-range 
and statistically indistinguishable.  
A pattern of results that is relevant for theories of metaphor interpretation is the 
difference observed between conditions A and C: while the conclusion was true in both 
of these conditions (e.g., ‘A zebra is not a horse’ and ‘The coach’s voice is not a 
foghorn’), participants were more prone to endorse the inference in condition A than in 
condition C. We interpret these results as evidence that in the latter condition, 
participants sometimes interpreted the negative conclusion as a negated metaphor 
(which they rejected because the corresponding simile was stated as true). That similes 
and metaphors were interchangeable in this task was confirmed in a control condition, 
in which participants agreed to the simile version of a metaphor 84% of the time. 
Experiment 3 shows that comparison statements of the form ‘x like a y’ give rise to non-
y inferences at least some of the time. The following section presents evidence that these 
non-y inferences are scalar implicatures.  
 
                                                 
9 As pointed out to us by one of the reviewers for this journal, the fact that agreement rates in the B-
condition were quite high despite the negative belief bias is additional evidence for our analysis. See 




Figure 5: Mean proportions of TRUE responses to the four types of conclusions used in 
Experiment 3 (SE bars; asterisk p < .083). 
 
5. Evidence for Hypothesis B: the non-y inference is a scalar implicature 
In order to explain the argument of this section, let us have a closer look at a run-of-the-
mill example of scalar implicature: 
(20) Some of the apples are red. 
(21) All the apples are red. 
An utterance of (20) may give rise to the implicature that, according to the speaker, (21) 
is false, i.e. that not all the apples are red. This inference is based on two assumptions 
that we left implicit so far: 
1. It is presupposed that, if the speaker knows (or believes) that all the apples are red, 
then he should have said (21) rather than (20), even if strictly speaking both 
sentences are true. That is to say, between these two sentences, (21) is the preferred 
way of describing a situation in which all the apples are red. 
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2. It is presupposed that the speaker knows whether or not all the apples are red. If 
the speaker isn’t knowledgeable with respect to the stronger claim (i.e. whether or 
not all the apples are red), the hearer is not entitled to infer that, according to the 
speaker, the stronger claim is false. The assumption that the speaker is 
knowledgeable with respect to the stronger claim is often called the ‘competence 
assumption’ (Soames, 1982; Horn, 1989; Sauerland, 2004; van Rooij & Schulz, 2004; 
see Geurts, 2010 for discussion and Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 2013 for experimental 
evidence). 
In conjunction with our Hypothesis B, these observations yield the following 
predictions: 
1. If a categorisation statement is true, it should be preferred to the corresponding 
comparison statement; that is to say, if x is a y, then ‘x is a y’ should be preferred to 
‘x is like a y’.10 We tested this prediction in Experiment 4. 
2. If there is reason to suppose that the speaker doesn’t know whether or not x is a y, 
then this should affect the likelihood that his uttering ‘x is like a y’ is felt to imply 
that x is not a y. This prediction was tested in Experiment 5. 
The materials used in Experiment 4 were similar materials to those used in Experiment 
2, but instead of asking people whether a certain description was true or false of a 
depicted animal, we asked them to rate descriptions of animals, vegetables, and fruits 
on a scale from 1 (‘completely unacceptable’) to 7 (‘perfectly acceptable’).11 Figure 6 
shows a sample item. As in Experiments 1a and 2, the materials included equal 
                                                 
10 Note that the preference for the stronger statement (if true) is a prerequisite for, but not the same thing 
as, the implicature that the stronger statement is false. Katsos & Bishop (2011) argue, correctly in our 
view, that some experimental studies have mixed these two things up, and show that they are dissociated 
in 5- and 6-year-old children. Relatedly, in order to explain why ‘x is like a y’ is infelicitous if x is known 
to be a y, we need not assume that a not-y implicature is derived. 
11 For extensive discussion on the use of rating tasks in implicature studies, see Geurts & van Tiel (2013) 
and Van Tiel (2014a, b). 
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numbers of categorisation and comparison statements. Orthogonally to this division, 
three types of sentences were used: (a) sentences with basic-level predicates (e.g., 
‘Labradors are (like) dogs’), (b) sentences with superordinate predicates (e.g., ‘Sharks 
are (like) predators’), and (c) sentences in which the head noun of the subject 
reappeared in the predicate (e.g., ‘Grizzly bears are (like) bears’). Finally, the materials 
included a control condition in the form of unobjectionable comparison statements (e.g., 
‘Wild boars are like pigs’). 
 
 
Figure 6: Sample item from Experiment 4 (rating task 
). 
We predict that if x is a y, the sentence ‘x is like a y’ should receive a poorer rating than 
‘x is a y’. As can be seen in Figure 7, the results of Experiment 4 confirmed this 
prediction. Whereas categorisation statements attained mean ratings at the top end of 
the scale, the ratings for comparison statements remained close to midpoint across the 
board, and in each condition ranked significantly lower than categorisation statements 
and felicitous controls of the ‘Wild boars are like pigs’ type. These findings agree with 




Figure 7: Mean appropriateness rates for categorisation and comparison statements in 
Experiment 4 (SE bars; asterisk p < .002). 
 
Our last experiment, number 5, was inspired by Goodman & Stuhlmüller’s (2013) 
study.  Participants were presented with the following vignette: 
 
The Municipal Museum has a painting called The Swedish Horseman, which was 
thought to be of no great value. However, a visiting expert expressed the opinion 
that it might actually be by Rembrandt. The museum director didn’t believe this, 
but agreed to submit the painting for testing. 
The painting is to be subjected to a series of 9 tests. It is agreed that if all the tests 
come back positive, there can be no doubt that the The Swedish Horseman was 
painted by Rembrandt. However, if one or more of the tests comes back negative, 




Participants were evenly and randomly allocated to one out of four conditions, two of 
which were critical, while the other two were controls. In the critical conditions, the 
story continued in either of the following ways: 
  
As of today, (a) all of the tests // (b) 7 of the 9 tests have been completed. A reporter 
asks the museum director to comment on the painting, and the director replies 
that: 
  The Swedish Horseman is like a Rembrandt. 
Would you conclude from this statement that, according to the director, The 
Swedish Horseman is not a genuine Rembrandt? 
In the (a) version, the competence assumption was justified: it was reasonable to 
suppose that the director knew whether or not The Swedish Horseman is a Rembrandt. In 
the (b) version, this assumption was not justified. 
In the control conditions, the story continued in either of the following ways: 
As of today, (a) all of the tests // (b) 7 of the 9 tests have been completed. A reporter 
asks the museum director to comment on the painting, and the director replies 
that: 
  Most of the tests came back positive. 
Would you conclude from this statement that, according to the director, some of 
the tests came back negative? 
In the (a) version, the competence assumption was justified: it was reasonable to 
suppose that the director knew whether or not all the tests came back positive. In the (b) 
version, this assumption was not justified. 
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Participants were given a 1-7 Likert scale to respond, where 7 was defined to mean that 
they definitely agreed with the suggested conclusion, while 1 was defined to mean that 
they definitely disagreed. Our prediction was that, in both the critical and the control 
conditions, ratings would be higher for the (a) version than for the (b) version. As 
shown in Figure 8, this prediction was borne out by the data. 
 
Figure 8: Mean agreement rates for the comparison statements (critical condition) and the 
quantified statements (control condition) used in Experiment 5 as a measure of the effect of the 
speaker’s competence in the derivation of scalar implicatures (SE bars; asterisk p < .02). 
 
The evidence presented in this section is consistent with two predictions which follow 
from our hypothesis that the non-y inference associated with ‘x is like a y’ statements 
are scalar implicatures. Our first prediction was that if x is a y, then ‘x is a y’ should be 
preferred to ‘x is like a y’; Experiment 4 indicates that such a preference does exist. Our 
second prediction was that the speaker’s knowledge as to whether or not x is a y should 
affect the likelihood that his uttering ‘x is like a y’ is felt to imply that x is not a y; 




6. Discussion and conclusions 
Both our theoretical arguments and empirical evidence were developed on the basis of 
literal language use. How is this study then relevant to models of metaphor 
interpretation? Importantly, those categorisation models of metaphor interpretation 
which have argued that categorisation and comparison statements are fundamentally 
different (what Chiappe et al. (2003b) call ‘the distinct statements view’) have also 
argued that metaphors and similes are understood using the same interpretation 
mechanisms as their literal counterparts (see, e.g., Glucksberg, 2001, 2008; Chiappe & 
Kennedy, 2001; Carston, 2002; Wilson & Carston, 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 2008; cf. 
Grice, 1975; Searle, 1979). We therefore assume that the present research is generally 
relevant to categorisation models of metaphor interpretation, despite its focus on literal 
language. 
Our study was prompted by the claim, made by proponents of the categorisation view 
of metaphor interpretation, that comparison statements (‘x is like a y’) and 
categorisation statements (‘x is a y’) are incompatible. The purpose of that claim was to 
argue against the Aristotelian view on metaphor, which holds that metaphors are 
implicit similes. By contrast, according to categorisation theorists, in ‘My lawyer is a 
shark’, for example, the predicate ‘shark’ expresses a superordinate concept SHARK* 
which applies to all manner of vicious, predatory creatures, including but not restricted 
to real sharks. In this view, if metaphors were implicit comparisons, the interpreter of 
‘My lawyer is a shark’ would have to compare my lawyer to SHARK*, which would be as 
infelicitous as comparing copper to a metal (see Barnden, 2012 for discussion). 
Contrary to this claim, we have argued that categorisation statements are compatible 
with comparison statements. More specifically, ‘x is a y’ unilaterally entails ‘x is like a y’. 
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Our experimental findings support our claims and show that people are happy to 
accept that copper is like a metal or that a nuthatch is like a bird (a result that we have 
replicated in a series of on-line experiments looking at the processing of categorisation 
and comparison statements; see Xxxxxx, in preparation)12. How problematic are these 
findings for categorisation models of metaphor interpretation? We don’t think that our 
argument undermines the basic insight underlying the categorisation account. In our 
view, the fundamental tenet of that account is that, in a figurative statement like 
‘Lawyers are sharks’, the predicate ‘sharks’ does not have its usual lexical meaning. 
Rather, its ordinary meaning is modulated so as to render it applicable to human 
beings. Once the contextual meaning of ‘sharks’ is adapted to the context, ‘Lawyers are 
sharks’ is on a par with ‘Hammerheads are sharks’: both sentences are categorisation 
statements claiming that the class of entities associated with the subject term fall under 
the concept associated with the predicate. We consider this to be a valuable insight, and 
we believe it is true. However, contrary to what categorisation theorists have supposed, 
we can accept that their central claim is true without having to accept that comparison 
statements and categorisation statements are fundamentally different.  
To prove this point, suppose that categorisation statements were interpreted as follows. 
(Just suppose: this is not a formal proposal. We are fully aware that the following 
analysis is overly simplistic at best. Its purpose is merely to show that the two claims 
held by categorisation theorists are in fact independent of one another. It’s a proof of 
concept, not of fact.) Someone utters a sentence of the form ‘x is a y’ or ‘x is like a y’. Let 
Cx and Cy be the concepts associated with x and y in the context in which the sentence is 
used. So if the sentence is, ‘Hammerheads are sharks’, Cx is the standard hammerhead 
concept and Cy is the standard shark concept. Likewise, if the sentence is, ‘Lawyers are 
                                                 
12 Contrary to the theoretical intuition that ‘An apple is like a fruit’ is anomalous, the results of various 
on-line experiments revealed that comparisons to a superordinate are verified equally often and 
significantly faster than felicitous comparisons such as ‘A pear is like an apple’. 
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like sharks’, Cx is the standard lawyer concept and Cy is the standard shark concept. In 
contrast, if the sentence is, ‘Lawyers are sharks’, Cx is the standard lawyer concept and 
Cy is a suitably modulated concept of sharks. (Note that at this point the analysis 
incorporates what we take to be the key tenet of the categorisation theory.) Suppose, 
furthermore, that a concept is simply a set of features. Then ‘x is a y’ is interpreted as 
meaning that Cy is a subset of Cx (e.g., hammerheads have all properties associated with 
sharks) and ‘x is like a y’ is interpreted as meaning that the size of the intersection 
between Cx and Cy exceeds a context-dependent threshold (e.g., lawyers have some of 
the properties associated with sharks). Hence, it follows immediately that ‘x is a y’ and 
‘x is like a y’ are not incompatible and moreover, that the former entails the latter (see 
also Chiappe & Kennedy, 2001). 
As simplistic as it may be, this model proves that the key tenet of the categorisation 
account of metaphor is consistent with our claim that ‘x is a y’ and ‘x is like a y’ are 
compatible statements. Therefore, contrary to what categorisation theorists have 
supposed, arguing that metaphors are interpreted as literal categorisation statements 
does not necessitate the assumption that ‘x is a y’ and ‘x is like a y’ are incompatible. It 
seems to us that, in their zeal to argue against the traditional view that metaphors are 
implicit similes, categorisation theorists have outreached themselves by defending the 
much stronger claim that the interpretation of metaphors doesn’t involve comparison in 
any way. 
Our argument opens the way for an approach to metaphor which accepts the key tenet 
of the categorisation view without closing the door on the ancient idea that metaphor 
involves comparison in some form or other. The simplistic model outlined above 
suggests one way in which comparison might be involved in the interpretation of 
metaphors: it could be part and parcel of the meaning of categorisation statements in 
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general (see Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). There might be other ways, too. For example, 
comparison might play a role in the construction of figurative meanings, like SHARK* 
(see Wearing, 2014). In any case, it seems to us that the core intuitions underlying the 
classical and the categorisation models may well turn out to be compatible. 
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50 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk. 
Materials and procedure 
We constructed a total of 108 slides including either a comparison or a categorisation 
statement (e.g., ‘This one is like a moirk’). The statement referred to a figure that was 
presented on the same slide (e.g., a triangle) and included a made-up category that was 
also defined on the same slide. The definitions consisted of three properties of each 
figure: shape, colour and border type (e.g., ‘Moirk: circle, blue, thick border’). The figure 
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on the slide could either share no property with the defined category (Similarity Level 
0), one property (Similarity Level 1), two properties (Similarity Level 2) or all three 
properties (Similarity Level 3). 
The critical items consisted of 40 pairs of slides, each pair including a comparison 
statement and a categorisation statement and 10 pairs corresponding with each of the 4 
possible degrees of similarity (i.e. Level 0-3). An extra 20 filler items included a true 
categorisation statement (Level 3) and another 8 items, one of each type, were used as 
warm-up trials. The warm-up trails were presented in the same random order to all 
participants, while the critical and filler items were randomized individually.  
Participants were asked to verify the statement that appeared at the top of each slide in 
relation to the figure and the definition that were presented underneath the statement. 
Participants were given a TRUE/ FALSE choice to respond. 
Results 
The mean proportions of TRUE responses in each condition are plotted in Figure 2. The 
overall pattern of results suggests that participants didn’t derive a non-y inference in 
interpreting the comparison statements. 
We fitted a logistic mixed-effects model, positing fixed effects of Statement Type and 
Similarity Level, and random effects of Participant and Item, as well as a random slope 
of Statement Type by Participant. (Models with additional random slopes did not 
converge.) This disclosed significant main effects of Statement Type and Similarity 
Level, and a significant interaction (p < 0.001, model comparison). 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons at different similarity levels were implemented using 
logistic mixed-effects models, positing a fixed effect of Statement Type and random 
effects of Participant and Item, as well as a random slope of Statement Type by 
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Participant. There was a significant main effect of Statement Type in the Level 2 
condition (β = 3.22, SE = 0.67, Z = 4.80, p < 0.001), but no significant main effect in the 
Level 1 condition (β = 0.70, SE = 3.34, Z = 0.21, p = 0.833) or the Level 3 condition (β = 
13.3, SE = 14.3, Z = 0.93, p = 0.352). The significant effect remains significant (p < 0.001) 
when corrected for multiple comparisons. 
Looking at individual performances, 25 of the 50 people who took part in the task 
adopted the categorisation strategy by default. That is, they responded TRUE in all cases 
of maximal similarity, responding FALSE in all Similarity Level 0-2 trials regardless of 
the type of statement. Removing those 25 participants from the analyses did not change 
the overall pattern of results greatly (see Figure 9 below). There was a 9% increase in the 
proportion of TRUE responses in the Level 1 condition and a 37% increase in the Level 2 
condition, but the mean proportion of TRUE responses in the Level 3 condition was still 
.90 (decreasing only 5% from the overall analyses). More specifically, only 2 participants 
systematically responded FALSE in the Comparison/ Level 3 condition. 
 
Experiment 1b 
Given that half of the participants in Experiment 1a applied the same strategy in the 
Categorisation and Comparison conditions (i.e., responded TRUE only in cases of 
maximal similarity), Experiment 1b tried to determine whether the results of the 
Comparison/ Level 3 condition may have been skewed. More specifically, we wanted to 
determine whether participants may derive a non-y inference in interpreting 






20 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk. 
Materials and procedure 
The materials were those used in Experiment 1a for the Comparison condition. The 
procedure was the same as in the first experiment. 
Results 
One participant was eliminated because he had responded randomly. The mean 
proportions of TRUE responses in each condition are plotted in Figure 9. The overall 
pattern of results suggests that participants didn’t derive a non-y inference in 
interpreting the comparison statements in Experiment 1b, in line with what was 
observed in Experiment 1a. 
 
Figure 9: Mean proportions of TRUE responses to comparison statements from those 
participants in Experiment 1a who didn’t adopt the categorisation strategy by default 










































Rather than increasing the proportion of TRUE responses in the Similarity Level 1 and 
Level 2 conditions, presenting participants only with comparison statements resulted in 
comparable agreement rates in the Level 1 condition and significantly lower agreement 
rates in the Level 2 condition. More importantly, in the Similarity Level 3 condition, the 
results were comparable between the two experiments. In fact, participants were more 
prone to agreeing with the comparison statements when they were not presented with 
categorisation statements in the same task and none of the participants in Experiment 
1b systematically rejected the comparison statements in the maximal-similarity 
condition (while 2 participants had done so in Experiment 1a). These results therefore 
suggest that the results of Experiment 1a were reliable and not an artefact of presenting 





20 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk.  
Materials and procedure 
We constructed 80 slides including a picture of an animal and a description of the 
animal in a bubble (e.g., ‘This one is a wild animal’ referring to a tiger). The descriptions 
made up 40 pairs of categorisation and comparison statements about 10 well-known 
animals. We used 4 different types of categories: (1) superordinates (e.g., ‘wild animal’ 
for a tiger), (2) same category (e.g., ‘tiger’ for a tiger), (3) similar category (e.g., ‘lion’ for 
a tiger) and (4) dissimilar category (e.g., ‘bear’ for a tiger). 
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The materials were presented in the same quasi-random order to all participants. In 
order to avoid possible issues with the identification of the animals in the pictures, the 
categorisation version of each Same-Category item was presented before the 
comparison version (i.e., participants had to agree to ‘This one is a tiger’ before they had 
to decide on ‘This one is like a tiger’). 
Participants were asked to verify a series of facts about 10 well-known animals that 
were presented in pictures. Participants were given a TRUE/ FALSE choice to respond. 
Results 
The mean proportions of TRUE responses for each condition are plotted in Figure 4. The 
overall pattern of results suggests that participants didn’t derive a non-y inference in 
interpreting the comparison statements relative to what is observed for the 
categorisation statements. 
We fitted a logistic mixed-effects model, positing fixed effects of Statement Type and 
Category Type, and random effects of Participant and Item, as well as a random slope 
of Statement Type by Participant. (Models with additional random slopes did not 
converge.) This disclosed significant main effects of Statement Type and Category Type, 
and a significant interaction (p < 0.001, model comparison). 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons for different category types were implemented using 
logistic mixed-effects models, positing a fixed effect of Statement Type and random 
effects of Participant and Item, as well as a random slope of Statement Type by 
Participant. There was a significant main effect of Statement Type in the Similar 
condition (β = 3.73, SE = 1.04, Z = 3.59, p < 0.001), which remains significant when 
corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.001), but no significant main effect in the 
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Dissimilar condition (β = 1.68, SE = 1.73, Z = 0.97, p = 0.33), Same condition (β = 4.67, SE = 





25 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk.  
Materials and procedure 
We constructed 42 different items of the form  
“John says: My mother is like a nurse.  
Would you conclude from this that, according to John, his mother is not a nurse?”  
The critical items consisted of 24 items evenly distributed in 4 conditions: true 
conclusion according to common knowledge (T/C); false conclusion according to 
common knowledge (F/C); true conclusion according to common knowledge if the 
conclusion is interpreted literally (T(lit.)/C), and possible conclusion according to the 
speaker’s private knowledge (P/SP). See Table 1 for an example of each condition. 
The statements in the T(lit.)/C condition were similes and the conclusions negated 
metaphors. Taken literally, the conclusions were obviously true since the metaphors 
included a category violation (e.g., ‘His ideas are like diamonds’ –> ‘His ideas are not 
diamonds’). The similes/ metaphors were relatively conventional.  
We used 12 filler items in the standard form, and 6 control items in which the statement 
was a relatively conventional metaphor and participants had to decide whether the 
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corresponding simile followed from the statement (e.g., ‘My lawyer is a shark’ –> ‘My 
lawyer is like a shark’). 
The materials were presented in the same random order to all participants. Participants 
were asked to decide whether, according to the person making the statement, a certain 
conclusion followed from what they had said. Participants were given a YES/ NO 
choice to respond. 
Results 
The mean proportions of TRUE responses in each condition are plotted in Figure 7. The 
results show different agreement rates in the various conditions depending on the 
hearer’s knowledge. 
We fitted a logistic mixed-effects model, positing fixed effects of Condition and random 
effects of Participant and Item, as well as a random slope of Condition by Participant. 
This disclosed a significant main effect of Condition (p < 0.01, model comparison). 
Follow-up pairwise comparisons were implemented by using the same model over 
subsets of the data. These models disclosed significant differences between the T/C 
condition and each of the other three conditions (F/C: β = 5.17, SE = 1.33, Z = 3.88, p < 
0.001; T(lit.)/C: β = 6.73, SE = 3.05, Z = 2.21, p < 0.05; P/SP: β = 5.28, SE = 1.69, Z = 3.13, p < 
0.001). Corrected for multiple comparisons, the T/C to F/C comparison is significant 
with p < 0.001, the T/C to T(lit.)/C comparison is marginally significant (p = 0.082) and 
the T/C to P/SP comparison is significant with p < 0.01. None of the other pairwise 
comparisons showed significant differences (F/C vs. T(lit.)/C: β = 0.67, SE = 1.08, Z = 
0.62, p = 0.535; F/C vs. P/SP: β = 0.356, SE = 0.907, Z = 0.39, p = 0.695; T(lit.)/C vs. P/SP: β = 







25 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk.  
Materials and procedure 
We constructed 54 slides each including a picture of an animal, fruit, or vegetable in the 
center. Underneath the picture was a short description, which could be in categorisation 
form (e.g., ‘Robins are birds’) or in comparison form (e.g., ‘Chickens are like a farm 
animals’). 
The critical items were 18 pairs of categorisation and comparison statements about 18 
well-known animals. 3 types of categories were used in the statements: (1) basic level 
(e.g., ‘Labradors are dogs’), (2) superordinate (e.g., ‘Sharks are predators’) and (3) name 
repeated (i.e., the category was already mentioned in the name of the animal; e.g., 
‘Grizzly bears are bears’).  
18 comparison statements were used as fillers, 9 depicting animals and 9 depicting 
fruits or vegetables. The filler items included two similar animals, fruits or vegetables 
(e.g., ‘Wild boars are like pigs’/ ’Shallots are like onions’). The two-animal fillers were 
used as a baseline for the critical comparison statements. The materials were presented 
in the same random order to all participants. 
Participants were asked rate a series of descriptions of animals, vegetables and fruits on 




The mean appropriatness ratings for each condition are plotted in Figure 6. The overall 
pattern of results suggests that categorisation statements were preferred over 
comparison statements in all conditions. 
As participants were generally consistent across items within each condition, we 
consider their means for each condition (i.e. we consider each participant to give rise to 
one data point per condition). Paired t-tests reveal highly significant differences 
between categorisation and comparison in each condition (all p < 0.001) and between 
each comparison condition and the control (all p < .002). However, as the data are not 
normally distributed, we also report the results of a non-parametric statistical test, 
namely the sign test. There is a highly significant preference for categorisation in all 
three conditions (21/25 participants in the Basic-Level condition, 21/25 participants in 
the Repetition condition, and 22/25 participants in the Superordinate condition: all p < 
0.001). There is also a highly significant preference for the comparisons in the control 
condition than in each of the other comparison conditions (19/25 participants in the 
Basic-Level condition, 19/25 participants in the Repetition condition, and 20/25 
participants in the Superordinate condition: all p < 0.008). 
 
Experiment 5  
Method 
Participants 
200 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk.  
Materials and procedure 
All participants were randomly presented with one of 4 types of narrative, 2 control and 
2 critical conditions. For the actual narrative, see the main text. At the end of the 
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narrative, participants were given a 1-7 Likert scale to indicate their interpretation of the 
final statement, with 1 meaning ‘Definitely disagree’ and 7 meaning ‘Definitely agree’. 
Results 
The mean ratings for each condition are plotted in Figure 8. In the Critical/ Partial 
knowledge condition, the mean rating was 4.94 (SD 1.64), with 10 participants giving 
the highest possible rating of 7. In the corresponding Full knowledge condition, the 
mean rating was 6.08 (SD 1.57), with 29 participants giving a maximum rating of 7. An 
unpaired t-test shows the difference in rating to be highly significant (t = 3.55, df = 98, p 
< 0.001). As the ratings are not normally distributed, we also consider the proportion of 
maximum ratings given in each condition: this exhibits a highly significant difference 
(Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001). 
By comparison, in the Control/ Partial knowledge condition, the mean rating was 5.50 
(SD 1.91), with 20 participants giving the rating of 7. In the corresponding Full 
knowledge condition, the mean rating was 6.32 (SD 1.32), with 31 participants giving 
the rating of 7. An unpaired t-test shows the difference in rating to be significant (t = 
2.50, df = 98, p < 0.016), and the proportion of maximal ratings also differs significantly 
(Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.05). 
